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ABSTRACT
THE IDENTIFICATION OF OBJECTS IN SCENES:
THE ROLE OF SCENE BACKGROUNDS IN OBJECT NAMING
FEBRUARY, 1990
SUSAN J. BOYCE, B.S., URSINUS COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by : Professor Alexander Pollatsek
The purpose of this research was to investigate the
role of scene backgrounds on object identification.
Previous research with brief presentation of scenes
indicated that scene context facilitated object
identification. Experiment 1 replicated this finding with
longer display durations. Experiments 2 and 3 were designed
to investigate the time course of background information
acquisition using an eye movement paradigm. Although the
results from Experiment 2 were inconclusive, Experiment 3
demonstrated that scene background information was acquired
on both the first and second fixations on a scene. It was
concluded that background information acquired from the
first and second fixations facilitates object
identification.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Understanding the process of object identification is
essential for our understanding of both human visual
processing capabilities and our understanding of the
organization of human memory. The human ability to
transform light falling on to the retina into meaningful
information is an amazing capability that we accomplish
effortlessly and without awareness. However, the cognitive
processes involved in making sense of our visual world are
complex and currently not very well understood.
On a broad level, the purpose of this dissertation is
to add to our knowledge of the cognitive processes involved
in human visual information processing. Object recognition
is just one of the tasks our visual system accomplishes. It
has been chosen for study primarily because it is a
definable task. That is, operationally we can define object
recognition as having a beginning (when light reflected off
the object falls onto the retina) and an end (when
information stored in memory about that object has been
accessed)
.
Much of the research on object identification has
focused on the issue of whether recognition is the result of
a bottom-up perceptual analysis that proceeds independently
of other cognitive processes or whether object recognition
is highly dependent on world knowledge stored in memory to
aid the perceptual processes. This is an important first
step to understanding visual processing because by
determining what information is used in object
identification we can begin to outline how the process is
carried out.
There are many different ways to investigate the
process of object identification. One obvious way is to
study how people recognize single objects in isolation,
realizing that this is a somewhat artificial situation.
Objects in the real world do not appear isolated but instead
occur as part of much more complicated "scenes". However,
it is thought that if we can explain the process of the
identification of a single object in isolation then
explaining object identification under more naturalistic
settings should follow logically. That is, the basic
processes involved in object recognition should be the same
whether or not the object is located in a scene context.
On the other hand, the process of object identification
may proceed very differently when an object is a part of a
more naturalistic scene than when it is in isolation. That
is, something about the scene information itself may play a
role in the object identification process. If this were the
case, then studying the process of object identification
with isolated objects may never bring us closer to the goal
of more generally understanding human visual information
processing.
2
Overview
The rest of this chapter is devoted to a review of what
we currently know about object identification and how scene
context affects the process of object identification. The
first section contains a review of a recent model of object
recognition proposed by Biederman (1987) . The model that he
puts forth is a bottom-up account of object recognition that
is based upon the idea that to recognize an object one must
first recognize the component parts of an object. I believe
this model to be the state-of-the-art in modelling the
object recognition process. Much about the model is
untested and, in fact, may be untestable, however, I think
it is important to include because it provides some insight
into where we currently are in our understanding of object
recognition. The second section of this chapter deals
with the literature on object recognition in scene context.
The general purpose of all this research was to determine
whether scene context plays a role in the identification of
objects.
A Model of Object Recognition
The most recent and most comprehensive model of object
recognition has been put forth by Biederman (1987). The
basic idea behind his Recognition-by-Components (RBC) model
is that objects are recognized by the identification of the
component "parts" of the object. Biederman 's model begins
describing the process of object identification after a
3
stage of edge extraction has already been completed. At the
level in visual processing where his model begins, the
representation is very much like a line drawing of an
object. The first stage in his model is the segmentation of
the object into its component parts. This segmentation is
accomplished by an algorithm that does not depend on
knowledge about the object's identity, but instead relies
only on the information available in the edge-based
representation. The resulting parts are then matched
against a set of primitive shapes stored in memory. This
results in a description of the object's shape in terms of
this constrained set of primatives. Finally, this
representation is matched against information in memory
about the object's identity.
In some respects, this model is like the old feature
models of letter recognition (e.g. Selfridge and Neisser,
1960) . Both depend on a componential form of analysis.
That is, the entire stimulus is not recognized as a whole.
Instead it is broken up into features, or parts, that are
identified first and this leads to the recognition of the
whole.
The advantage of this kind of model over a template
model is that it attempts to define in a constrained way
what sort of information is stored in memory and how the
matching occurs between incoming visual information and
stored information in memory. Biederman (1987) claims that
all objects are composed of some combination of a limited
set of volumetric shapes (his name for these is geons) . Th(
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identity of an object is defined by which particular
volumetric primitives it is made of and the spatial
relations of these components to one another. For example,
a coffee mug is made up of two geons, a cylinder geon (makes
the cup part) and a curved cylinder (which makes the
handle)
.
The part of the model that is least well defined is
exactly how these relations between the geons become
specified. That is, a coffee mug is not the only object
made up of a straight cylinder geon and a curved cylinder
geon. These same geons define the shape of a bucket.
Biederman and others (Rock, 1983, for example) propose that
a structural description is formed that specifies the
relations between the parts. Thus, the structural
description for the coffee mug would differ from that of the
bucket in the way in which the geons were attached together.
So far, Biederman has not specified how this structural
description is formed. Nor has he clearly defined whether a
structural description is like a map (spatially organized)
or some kind of list of propositions.
For all of its problems, Biederman 's model is probably
one of the most detailed models of object recognition to
date. Perhaps the best aspect of his model is that he has
precisely defined an algorithm that segments an object into
constituent parts that only relies on the visual input. The
parts that result of this segmentation algorithm correspond
well with our phenomonological impression of what should be
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a part (dividing a coffee cup into the cup part and the
handle part, for example)
. Furthermore, there is some
behavioral evidence to suggest that when the information
that serves as input to the algorithm is missing from an
object, identification is extremely difficult or impossible
(Biederman and Blickle, 1985) . Also, his explanation of
exactly how the parts are fitted by the appropriate geon is
fairly detailed and depends only upon the information
contained within a two-dimensional "line-drawing like"
representation.
Perhaps the knottiest problem with the RBC model lies
in testing the validity of these shape primitives; geons.
After the object has been segmented into its constituent
parts, the resulting part is compared to the set of 36
primitives. The nearest match will then be used to describe
the shape of that region of the object. This "nearest
match" situation makes it impossible to really test whether
he has properly defined the set of visual primitives,
because in his definition everything will be "fit" by one of
the geons to some approximation. Thus, there really is no
such thing as a part that is not a geon and this makes this
aspect of the model somewhat untestable.
Overall, however, Biederman has begun to outline a
framework of object recognition which is detailed enough to
make a number of predictions and advance our knowledge about
the object recognition process. The problems with the model
are that the definition of "geon" is sufficiently vague that
it may not be useful and the concept of the structural
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description is still left very unclear. But the bottom-up
nature of this model has some appeal.
Validity of the Edge Based Approach
The point must be made that the RBC model rests on the
assumption that perceptual analysis is preceded by an edge
detection process (i.e. that further processing of an image
proceeds on a representation that is virtually a line
drawing, no matter what the input was like) . Thus,
information about color and texture (surface
characteristics) plays no role in the initial processing of
the stimulus. Information about the surface characteristics
does not in any way affect the initial access to the memory
representation for that object under most normal situations.
It could be argued that this assumption is self-serving.
That is, it is much easier to do this kind of research with
line drawings as opposed to color photographs, so hence the
assumption.
In fact, there does exist some data that would argue
that surface characteristics cannot be ignored in models of
object recognition. Ostergaard and Davidoff (1985)
presented subjects with photographs of fruits and vegetables
in their first experiment. The photographs were either
black and white or in color and the subjects had to name the
object. They found a significant advantage in object naming
times when the objects were presented in color over black
and white. In a second experiment they tested whether this
7
advantage for color photographs would occur in an object
recognition task, as well as a naming task. They wanted to
hold color constant so they used three stimuli that had a
similar color (tomato, radish and strawberry) and
photographed them in color, in black and white, and then, in
order to test the effect of the inappropriate color, they
spray painted the objects blue and took color photographs.
One group of subjects named the objects as before. For a
second group of subjects, a target object was specified (the
radish for example) and they were to respond yes/no on each
trial as to whether it was the radish. They again found an
advantage in naming time for color photographs (the correct
color) over black and white. (They found no difference
between the black and white trials and the blue trials)
.
However, this advantage for correct color slides did not
exist on the recognition task. Thus, they conclude that
color facilitates object naming, but not object recognition.
There are aspects of this study that do not seem quite
right. First of all, it could be the case that there are
classes of objects in which color is important for
identification. The objects chosen by Ostergaard and
Davidoff seem to fall into that category. Many fruits and
vegetables are similar in terms of their shapes and
therefore it must be something about their surface
characteristics that distinguish them. So they may have
stacked the deck to get color effects by the choice of their
stimuli. Secondly, I find it surprising that if color is so
important, that they did not get an interference effect for
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objects that are the inappropriate color (blue strawberry,
for example)
.
This could be because there was such a
limited set of objects (three, shown for hundreds of trials)
and that the same inappropriate color was used for each
object.
Biederman and Ju (1988) conducted their own study to
determine whether color of an object really is important to
the identification process. They presented subjects with
line drawings of objects or color photographs of the same
objects and recorded both naming times and recognition times
as did Ostergaard and Davidoff (1985) . They found no
difference in either measure (naming or recognition) between
the color photographs and the line drawings. They then went
back and classified their objects as having a diagnostic
color or not using the rationale that, perhaps for some
classes of objects, color is more important. They performed
an items analysis on the basis of this sorting and still
found no advantage for color photographs. From this they
conclude that color information is not important for the
first contact with the memory representation, and that only
later on in the process should color/surface information be
registered.
Their diagnostic/non-diagnostic color distinction is
not terribly impressive. The examples of objects with
diagnostic color are banana, fork, fish and camera as
opposed to chair, pen, mitten and bicycle pump for non
diagnosticity of color. It seems as though there are other
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objects that would be better candidates for the diagnostic
color category, such as orange, apple, leopard, tiger, etc.
However, Biederman does concede that there may be classes of
objects where the only distinguishing features between the
members are their surface characteristics, and he proposes
that identification of these objects would take longer.
The issue of whether the identification of line
drawings is exactly the same as identification of more
naturally represented objects is obviously not one that has
been settled. On some level it is hard to believe that
surface characteristics, such as color and texture, play no
role in object identification. On the other hand, the
behavioral evidence collected on this issue seems mixed.
The research conducted as part of this dissertation used
line drawings of objects and scenes as stimuli. The
decision to use line drawings as representations of objects
and scenes in the real world was made for two reasons: a)
since it is not clear that the perception of photographs is
qualitatively different than the perception of line drawings
and b) working with line drawings allows the experimenter
much more control over the stimulus display.
Biederman 's RBC model, as it currently stands, accounts
for the process of object recognition without calling upon
world knowledge to supplement the perceptual processes. He
has outlined a framework of recognition that is dependent
only on the information contained within a two-dimensional
representation of the visual stimulus. In the following
section evidence will be reviewed that suggests that context
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plays an important role in object recognition. Although
Biederman ' s RBC model currently does not indicate the role
of scene context on object identification it could easily be
adapted to incorporate scene context effects.
The Role of Scene Context in Object Identification
Much of the research in picture perception has focused
on the issue of how context affects the object
identification process. It is presumed that by studying the
situations where object identification is speeded or
impaired we might gain a better understanding of the
processes involved in identifying objects in the natural
world.
It has been repeatedly demonstrated that objects
located in a coherent scene context are identified more
accurately than objects located in an incoherent scene
context (Antes, 1974; Antes, 1977; Antes and Mann, 1984;
Antes and Penland, 1981; Antes, Penland and Metzger, 1981;
Biederman, 1972; Biederman, 1981; Biederman, Mezzanotte and
Rabinowitz, 1982; Biederman, Rabinowitz, Glass and Stacy,
1974; Boyce, Pollatsek and Rayner, 1989; Friedman, 1979;
Loftus and Mackworth, 1978) . A number of theories have been
developed to explain this phenomenon. The basic idea behind
these theories is that something about the scene context
facilitates the initial contact with a memory representation
for the target object. The two important aspects of these
theories are the locus of the scene context effects (that
11
is, what in the scene is actually doing the facilitating)
and the mechanism of facilitation (how the facilitation
happens)
• I will begin with a discussion of the literature
concerning the locus of scene context effects and then deal
with the issue of mechanism.
Locus of Scene Context Effects
Something present in the scene context must be
responsible for the more rapid identification of objects
located in coherent scenes. In order to investigate which
aspects of a coherent scene are important one must know what
makes a scene seem coherent. Biederman, Mezzanotte and
Rabinowitz (1982) attempted to define scene coherence as the
relationships between the objects in a scene. They proposed
that a scene could be considered coherent if all the objects
obeyed the following principles of relationships:
Probability - an object is likely to occur in the context;
Size - an object is in correct proportion to the rest of the
scene; Position - an object is in the correct location in
the scene; Support - an object appears to obey the laws of
gravity and; Interposition - an opaque object occludes what
is behind it.
Biederman et al. (1982) presented scenes for 150 ms and
measured percent correct on an object identification task.
They found that an object violating one or more of these
relation principles was harder to identify than the same
object without a violation. Biederman et al. suggested that
scene context effects were due to these relationships
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between the objects. That is, early in scene viewing these
relationships are identified and through the extraction of
these relationships, appropriate memory structures are
activated and the object identification process is
facilitated.
This argument, however, is circular. If accessing this
relational information facilitates one's ability to identify
a target object, then it must come before the object has
been identified. But all of these relations seem to be
dependent on first knowing the identity of the object. That
is, how can you know that a sofa does not belong in the
street scene, unless you have already identified the context
and, more importantly, that the object in question is a sofa
and not a truck?
Biederman at al. counter that some of the relations are
dependent on knowing the identity of the object
(probability, position and size) while others can be
accessed without knowing the meaning of the object (support,
interposition) . His argument is that one may know that an
object is lacking support, such as a sofa floating in mid-
air, from a low level parsing of the background that
indicates that the sofa is not resting on a solid surface
and that this parsing stage occurs very early in the
processing of the scene (before you have identified the
object) . Parsing, in this context refers to the assignment
of line segments as belonging to an object or belonging to
some other entity in the scene. However, even if one can
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determine that an object lacks support in the scene very
early in processing, one still has to know that it is a sofa
to realize that it is violating a relation because some
objects do not require support (e.g. airplanes). Therefore,
it is not clear that these scene relations defined by
Biederman et al., can be accessed prior to the identity of
objects in the scene.
Loftus and Mackworth (1978) claimed that something
about the global meaning of the scene or "gist" is important
in facilitating the processing of the objects, using as
evidence where people chose to look in a scene. They
monitored eye movements while subjects viewed scenes for 4
seconds each. Some of the scenes contained objects that
were very unlikely to occur given the scene context (i.e.
octopus in a farm background, tractor in an underwater
background) . They found that low probability objects were
fixated earlier, were fixated more often, and were fixated
for longer durations. From these data Loftus and Mackworth
claimed that subjects readily obtain the "gist" of the scene
(within the first fixation) and partially identify objects
in the periphery. This partial object identification then
leads subjects to compute the probabilities that these
objects are likely to occur given the gist and the eye is
guided to the low probability objects first.
Loftus' model places a lot of importance on the first
fixation on the scene. In his view, it seems as though most
of the processing required to understand the scene is
conducted in the first 150 ms. Even the objects are
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"partially" identified. This is a claim that will be
addressed later in the paper. A second problem with Loftus»
model is his dependence on fixation duration as a dependent
measure. It could be that subjects fixated the octopus
longer in the farm context because it was interesting or
anomalous. That is, subjects could have identified the
octopus as rapidly in the farm scene as in the underwater
scene, but were having problems making sense of the scene.
Loftus' results cannot distinguish between these two
explanations. Furthermore, subjects might have seen their
task as "finding the strange object" and this led to the
target object being fixated early in scene viewing.
Boyce, Pollatsek and Rayner (1989) conducted a series
of experiments in an attempt to be more diagnostic about
what aspects of scene context facilitate object
identification. They reasoned that a scene could be thought
of as a background and a collection of objects. Objects
were defined as small closed figures that subtended
approximately two degrees of visual angle and had the
characteristic that they were "movable" entities. That is,
they were things that could be moved around in the real
world (for example, a toaster). A "background" was defined
as a large entity, taking up most of the visual field
(approximately 15 degrees) and had the characteristic of
being locally meaningless. That is, any small region of the
background would not convey the meaning of the background.
The visual information that contained the meaning was
15
distributed over almost the entire visual field. Boyce et
al. were interested in the role of scene backgrounds in
object identification. In the first experiment objects were
located either in a consistent background (bedroom objects
in bedroom background) , in an inconsistent background
(bedroom objects in refrigerator background) or in no
background (see figure 1) . Subjects were first presented
with a the name of a target object. The scene then appeared
for 150 ms followed by a pattern mask consisting of randomly
placed line segments and angles. A filled circle located
within the pattern mask served as a location cue indicating
the possible position of the target object. Subjects were
to respond 'yes' or 'no' as to whether the target named at
the beginning of the trial was present at the cued location.
This paradigm was exactly the same as Biederman's (1982).
The purpose of Boyce et al.'s research was to a) replicate
Biederman's context effect with the violation of probability
and b) to be more precise about the locus of this context
effect (i.e. scene backgrounds instead of object relations).
Subjects were more accurate at identifying objects in
the consistent backgrounds than in the inconsistent
backgrounds. However, subjects were equally accurate in the
consistent backgrounds and the no background control.
Hence, context affected performance, but the effect appeared
to be interference from the inconsistent backgrounds rather
than facilitation from the consistent backgrounds.
The second experiment attempted to determine the
relative contributions of backgrounds and non-target objects
16
on target object identification using the same task. In
Experiment 1, every scene was made up of five objects that
belonged together in a scene (e.g. bedroom objects) and only
the consistency of the background with this object set was
manipulated. In the second experiment, both the consistency
of the background (with respect to the target object) and
the consistency of the cohort (non-target) objects were
independently varied. The results indicated that there was
no effect of cohort consistency. That is, all of the effect
of context observed in the first experiment was due to the
degree of background consistency and the cohort objects
contributed nothing.
The third experiment was designed to determine whether
the observed effects of context were due to consistent
backgrounds facilitating object identification or
inconsistent background interfering with object
identification. In Experiment 1 performance with the
consistent backgrounds was equal to performance with the no
background controls. Thus it appeared as though
inconsistent backgrounds interfered with object
identification. However, it could have been the case that
performance was relatively good in the no background
controls for a different reason than that producing the good
performance in the Consistent Background condition. That
is, perhaps the good performance in the No Background
controls was because these scenes were less visually complex
than the scenes with backgrounds. In order to test this
17
hypothesis, nonsense backgrounds were created that consisted
of approximately the same number of line segments as the
backgrounds, but conveyed no meaning. Experiment 3 was a
replication of Experiment 1 with the nonsense backgrounds in
place of the no background controls. The results indicated
that consistent backgrounds facilitated object
identification while inconsistent backgrounds did not
interfere.
These experiments, taken as a whole, seem to indicate
that background information, as defined by Boyce et al. is
responsible for the scene context effects, while cohort
objects in the scene have no effect on the identification of
the target object. However, other research exists that
indicates that cohort objects in the scene may play an
important role in facilitating object identification.
Friedman (1979) proposed that some objects in scenes
may be responsible for facilitating further object
identification. She argued that some objects are obligatory
given the scene context (e.g. refrigerator in kitchen scene)
while other objects are non-obligatory (e.g. plant in
kitchen scene) . Obligatory objects may provide access to
memory for similar scenes which should facilitate further
scene processing. Although she did not collect data to
directly test the role of obligatory objects as a source of
context effects, she has evidence for the distinction
between obligatory and non-obligatory objects. Friedman
recorded eye movements while subjects viewed scenes in
preparation for a recognition memory test. She found that
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first fixation durations were shortest on obligatory objects
and were longest on unexpected objects that did not fit in
the scene at all. First fixations on non-obligatory objects
were of intermediate duration.
A second source of support for objects as the locus of
scene context effects comes from Henderson, Pollatsek and
Rayner (1987)
.
They proposed that objects might facilitate
one another in scene context due to the semantic
relationships between objects likely to occur in the same
scene. They presented subjects with two objects that were
to be fixated sequentially and recorded eye movement times
and time to name the second object. They found that
fixating a related object prior to the target object
facilitated naming time for the target object. Thus,
fixating a picture of a doctor before fixating a picture of
a nurse facilitated the time to say "nurse". However, these
objects were not located in scenes, but as isolated objects
without context. Thus it is unclear how this relates to
research on scenes.
Conclusions about the locus of scene context effects
are hard to draw from the above review. Boyce et al. have
evidence that global information gained from scene
backgrounds is an important source of contextual information
and that cohort objects provide little, whereas data from
Henderson et al. indicate that object information may also
serve as the locus of context effects. These findings may
not be quite as contradictory as they first seem. The
19
methodologies employed were quite different (this will be
discussed in more detail later) and it is possible that both
object and global background information play a role in
scene context effects.
Mechanism of Facilitation
Two opposing theories exist about the mechanism of
scene context effects. One theory, put forth by Biederman
(1982), Friedman (1979), and others (Antes et al., 1981;
Loftus, 1983) holds that a schema or frame for the
particular scene is accessed early in scene viewing. The
second theory holds that a much simpler priming mechanism
can account for scene context effects (Henderson et al.,
1987) .
What is a schema? . The typical definition given in
response to this question is that a schema is a
hierarchically organized memory structure. This definition
is accurate but fairly abstract. All the knowledge of the
world that we have must be organized in our memory in some
way. When presented with a concept such as "kitchen", we
are able to access lots of information related to that
concept fairly easily. We know that a kitchen is a room in
the house generally used for cooking. Also, we know that
utensils to accomplish this task (pots and pans, coffee
makers, spoons, etc.) are all likely to occur in the
kitchen. We know that stoves and refrigerators occur in
kitchens and generally don't occur in other rooms of the
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house and so on. A schema is one way to think about how
this information is organized. That is, information that is
relevant to a particular concept is bundled together so that
activating one concept makes it easier to access the
concepts that are bundled with it.
One thing that makes schemas different from other
organizations of memory (semantic networks, for example) has
to do with what particular concepts are grouped together. A
schema is organized around everyday events and scenes.
Concepts that typically co-occur in an event or scene will
be grouped together. Thus the basis of organization is
"episodic" knowledge, not abstract, semantic knowledge.
A second characteristic of schemas is their
hierarchical organization. This means that concepts that
are episodically related but at different levels in category
membership are organized such that more basic level concepts
are grouped under higher order concepts. Thus, "bedroom"
might be the top concept representation with objects that
are likely to occur in a bedroom represented at a lower
level and connected to the "bedroom" node.
A third characteristic of schemas is that for any
particular concept there exists a default value. That is,
when you read the word "spoon" probably the spoon that comes
to mind is not a serving spoon or soup spoon, but the
ordinary metal dinner spoon. That is, contained within the
schema organization is also the information about which
subordinate concepts are most frequent.
21
A scene schema is knowledge about a place that is
organized in the manner outlined above. The superordinate
concept usually is thought of as corresponding to the
setting, such as "kitchen". Grouped under this concept are
the representations for objects that are likely to occur in
the scene and each object is also represented by its own
schema. When one of the concepts in this structure becomes
activated, this activation is spread to the other concepts
that are connected to the activated node.
The critical difference between the schema organization
and a semantic network, for the purposes of the current
research, has to do with whether the relationships between
the concepts are based upon episodic or semantic
associations. Schemas predict that concepts that co-occur
in the world are connected in memory. That is, the
connections between representations in memory directly
reflect our experiences in the world. Semantic networks, on
the other hand, are organized around more generalized,
abstracted knowledge and category structures.
To summarize, a schema is a possible organization of
world knowledge in memory. The general principles that
define a schema are a) concepts that co-occur in scenes and
events in the real world are connected in memory, b)
concepts are represented at many levels of specificity and
arranged hierarchically, and c) there exists default values
that usually represent the most common instantiation of the
concept.
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One final aspect of schema organization that is often
included in the definition of schema is that schemas also
contain information about the preferred spatial locations of
objects within scenes. It has been proposed (Biederman et
al., 1982) that somehow information about the spatial
position of an object is contained in the connection between
the object representation and the superordinate
representation. There is no clear discussion in the
literature as to how this information is represented in the
schema. Since this aspect of schema organization is not
very well understood and the experiments reported in this
paper do not directly test the issue of spatial locations in
schemas, I will not consider it further.
Schemas and Context Effects . If schemas are to be of
value in accounting for the fact that scene context
facilitates object identification, then one must explain how
a particular schema gets activated and how this facilitates
the process of identification. One possibility is that
identification of global contextual information makes the
first contact with the schema for that scene. Once the
superordinate concept for the scene has been activated, the
rest of the concepts grouped together in the schema for that
scene become partially activated. The data from Boyce et
al. (1989) and from Loftus and Mackworth (1978) would argue
that global scene context activates the appropriate schema.
A different route to schema activation has been proposed by
Friedman (1979). She suggests that the identification of an
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obligatory object in the scene accesses the correct schema,
which then speeds up the identification of the remaining
objects.
Both of these routes to schema activation could be
correct. That is, it may not matter what aspect of the
scene is identified first, whether it is the scene
background or a particular key object. The important
finding is that something about having an object in a scene
seems to facilitate object identification and this
facilitation may be accomplished by way of activating the
appropriate scene schema.
Object to Object Priming
A very different mechanism of facilitation has been
proposed by Henderson et al. (1987). They argued that
facilitation occurs between related objects by a process of
automatic, spreading activation, whereby objects in a scene
that are related semantically or associatively facilitate
one another. The difference between this view and that put
forth by the schema theorists is the prediction of what
should facilitate what. That is, if objects are connected
to one another in a pre-existing semantic network as
proposed by Henderson et al. and facilitation is the result
of spreading activation through this network, then it is
unclear how higher-order conceptual information can produce
facilitation in object identification. In this scheme,
context effects can only occur from activating a close
neighbor of a particular object in the network. The
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advantage of this theory is that it makes much clearer
predictions concerning which objects should prime each
other. Objects that are semantically related, such as
"coat" and "hat" should facilitate one another. Also,
objects that are strong associates of one another should
result in facilitation, such as "doctor" and "nurse".
However, the validity of object to object priming as a
theoretical explanation of scene context effects rests on
its ability to explain facilitation effects found with
normal scenes. The assumption is that objects that are
strong associates of one another or are semantically related
are commonly' found in the same scene. While it is true that
coats and hats can appear in a scene together, I would argue
that there is a different level of relationship between
objects in most scenes. Many objects in scenes are
episodically related
,
meaning that they can co-occur given
the setting information but a priori would not be strongly
related to one another. For example, both a teddy bear and
a suitcase could appear in a scene sitting on a bed. These
objects can co-occur in the bedroom scene, yet they are not
semantically or associatively related.
To summarize, work on scene context effects has focused
on the issue of what in the scene is responsible for the
facilitation of object identification and how this
facilitation occurs. The research conducted by Boyce et al.
(1989), Loftus and Mackworth (1978), Friedman (1979) and
Biederman et al. (1982) argues that a schema for the scene
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is activated early in scene viewing and this facilitates
further scene processing. There is little agreement or
specificity concerning what aspects of the scene are
responsible for this facilitation. However, much of the
evidence indicates that global information about the setting
of the scene may be at least partly responsible.
Methodological Problems with the Previous Research
Most of the research discussed in the previous section
has been conducted with either brief presentation using
accuracy as the primary measure or with eye movement
monitoring techniques. The rationale behind the brief
presentation is to simulate the first fixation on a scene.
The durations of the display in this research range from 100
to 200 ms. This is approximately the length of first
fixations on scenes when not presented tachistoscopically
(Loftus, 1983).
There are two possible problems with brief presentation
research. First, one could argue that this methodology may
overestimate the effect of context during normal scene
viewing. When a scene is presented for 100-200 ms, subjects
do not have time to identify all of the scene elements. In
the cases where the subject has not identified the target
object during the scene exposure, the presence/identity of
the target object may be inferred from what the subject
knows is likely to occur, given his world knowledge and some
partial scene information.
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Second, it is possible that brief presentations are not
appropriate simulations of one fixation on a scene. It
could be that subjects employ attentional strategies with t-
scope displays that they would not use in normal scene
viewing. When the scene is presented for 100 ms and the
subjects have no idea where the critical region of the
picture is prior to the trial, they may try to diffuse their
attention over the entire visual field. This strategy could
be beneficial, since some information should be obtained
from most regions of the scene which may outweigh the cost
of not processing any one location of the scene very well.
However, this same strategy may not be so beneficial when
the viewing time is longer and there is not such a pressing
need to process all areas of the scene at once.
The other paradigm used in this research has been eye
movement monitoring. Typically this is done while subjects
view scenes for longer durations (approximately 2-10
seconds) . Commonly, subjects are instructed that there will
be a recognition memory test for the pictures. The
dependent variables of interest are fixation duration and
fixation location. It is thought that subjects will fixate
informative regions of the scene early and that fixation
duration will reflect object identification time. There are
also some problems with this technique. First, studying a
picture for a later recognition memory test may be very
different than other types of viewing. It is possible that
subjects pay more attention to small details of a scene than
they would if a different task had been employed. The
second problem with this research is the validity of the
dependent measures. Although fixation duration has been
demonstrated to be a correlate of word identification time
in reading (Blanchard, 1985; Rayner and Pollatsek, 1987) the
situation could be different for pictures. It is possible
that duration of a fixation on an object could primarily
reflect higher order factors such as subjects' interest in
the particular object rather than time to identify the
object.
The Current Methodology
The best way to investigate context effects on object
identification would be to allow subjects enough time to
view the scenes "normally" and use some measure of object
identification time besides fixation duration. The
procedure used in the following experiments approximates
these requirements. The basic idea is that subjects fixate
two locations in a scene, with the first fixation in the
center of the display and the second on a target object.
Object identification time is assessed by measuring the time
to name the target object. The procedure is similar to that
used by Henderson et al. (1987), and Pollatsek, Rayner and
Collins, (1984) except that the objects were embedded in
normal scene context.
However, since there are many objects in a given scene,
a cue must be given to indicate which object was the target
object. Therefore, during the first fixation on the scene
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(in the center) one of the objects is moved (approximately
1/2 degree) and quickly returned to its original position.
This movement is easily perceived by the subjects and serves
as a location cue for the target object. The subject's task
is to move his or her eyes to the target object and name it
as quickly as possible.
This procedure has some important advantages over t-
scope presentation. Since the scene was present for as much
time as the subject needs to complete the task, there should
be no need for the subject to invoke atypical attentional
strategies. Also, since the subject always has time to
fixate the target object there should be no need for the
subject to rely on context more in this task than in normal
scene viewing. That is, subjects will not have to infer the
identity of the target object post-perceptually, since a
trial does not end until the subject has named the object.
The dependent measures — naming time, fixation
durations and fixation locations — together should be a
better reflection of object identification processes than
fixation duration alone, as has been previously used. Time
to name an object seems a reasonable correlate of actual
identification time given current theories of object
recognition (Kroll and Potter, 1984; Theios and Amrhein,
1988) . It has been proposed that an object must be
identified conceptually in order to access the stored name,
whereas with words it is possible to produce the name
without necessarily contacting the meaning.
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The research reported in this paper was conducted to
further our understanding of the effect of scene context on
object identification. The purpose of the first experiment
was to determine whether scene backgrounds facilitated
object identification with a different task. That is, it
was of interest whether given good perceptual information
about the scene and the target object (i.e. longer viewing
duration, opportunity to fixate the target object) context
would still affect object identification. This is important
since the bulk of experimental evidence for scene context
effects is from the t-scope paradigm.
The second and third experiments assessed the time
course of contextual information acquisition. The
experiments tested whether context was processed a) only on
the first fixation on the scene, b) mostly on the second
fixation on the scene or c) during both fixations on the
scene. Through an understanding of the time course of
contextual processing we can better understand the mechanism
by which context facilitates the object identification
process
.
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CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT 1
Introduction
The purpose of the first experiment was to determine
whether scene context affects object identification using a
more controlled methodology than has been previously
employed. As mentioned in the introduction, there are a
number of reasons to question the body of literature on
context effects because of the methodology used. Evidence
from tachistoscopic displays may overestimate context
effects and previous eye movement research with objects in
context may have used a contaminated dependent measure.
This experiment attempts to determine whether context
affects object identification when the methodological
problems are el iminated
.
Method
Subjects
Eight graduate and undergraduate students from the
University of Massachusetts participated in the experiment.
The subjects were paid $15 for their participation and the
experiment took 3 one-hour sessions.
Stimuli
There were 64 scenes used in the experiment, which were
constructed from an original set of 16 scenes. These 16
scenes were line drawings of rooms of a house (e.g. bedroom
scene), common public places (e.g. diner/lunch counter), and
common outdoor scenes (e.g. street scene). (See Appendix
for a list and description of scenes)
. Each of the original
16 scenes consisted of a background and five objects that
belonged in the background. These 16 scenes were modified
to create the Consistent Background scenes, the Inconsistent
Background scenes and the Nonsense Background scenes.
The original 16 Consistent scenes were organized in 8
scene pairs such that objects in both scenes in the pair
were roughly equivalent in real-world size. The 16
Inconsistent Background scenes were created by switching
objects in one scene with objects in the paired scene. The
placement of objects in the Inconsistent background was
subject to the requirement that the objects not appear
unsupported (which required rearranging the objects in many
cases) . In no case was the actual size of objects altered.
However, since the objects were in different locations in
the Consistent background and Inconsistent background
conditions, Nonsense Backgrounds were used to control for
the effects of this object relocation.
Nonsense backgrounds were created by distorting the
original backgrounds in order to delete the semantic
information contained in the background. Distortions were
created with the following criteria in mind: a) nonsense
backgrounds should not look like the original backgrounds;
b) subjects should not be able to name these backgrounds; c)
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roughly the same number of lines and angles should be
employed in the nonsense background as in the original; d)
and nonsense backgrounds should preserve a three dimensional
quality. The nonsense backgrounds resulting from this set
of criteria did not appear as a random set of line segments,
but as a "coherent" background that lacked theme
information. The three-dimensionality of the nonsense
backgrounds was preserved in order to provide planes on
which objects could be supported. The objects were situated
in the nonsense backgrounds in exactly the same places as
they were in their matched meaningful background. Thus, the
effects of distance from the fovea could be assessed
independently of semantic content of the background. Each
original background had a nonsense background version.
The end result was 16 background consistent scenes, 16
background inconsistent scenes and two sets of nonsense
background scenes of 16 scenes each. The two sets of
nonsense scenes were the result of placing objects in the
nonsense backgrounds to match the spatial locations of
consistent scenes and inconsistent scenes. The scenes
subtended approximately 15 degrees visual angle and the
objects subtended approximately 2 degrees visual angle.
These stimuli were exactly the same as used by Boyce et al.
(1989), Experiment 3.
Design
Each subject named each target object in all four
background conditions (consistent, inconsistent and two
nonsense controls). Each scene contained five objects, four
of which served as target objects to be named. In each
scene, the object that was most difficult to name in a prior
pilot study was not included as a target object. Thus, in
the experiment, each of 64 target objects appeared in four
conditions, resulting in 256 trials. Trials were presented
in a random order.
Apparatus
The scenes were displayed on a Megatek Whizzard vector
plotting CRT with a P-31 phosphor. This was interfaced with
a VAX 11-730 computer. Short vectors (under 1/4 degree
visual angle) were plotted in 1.2 microseconds per vector
and long vectors were plotted in 2.0 microseconds. Total
plotting time for an average scene was under 4 ms. Eye
movements were monitored with an SRI Generation V Dual
Purkinje eye tracker interfaced with the computer. Naming
times were measured by a standard switch closure voice key
(Gerbrands) . Subjects' naming times, eye positions, and
fixation durations were collected and stored by the
computer.
Procedure
Subjects were initially shown the set of 64 target
objects, one at a time, in isolation, in order to establish
names for the objects. A pilot study indicated that most
subjects used the same names for the objects. However,
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subjects were allowed to use any name they felt comfortable
with, provided they were consistent across trials. After
the naming practice, subjects placed their heads on a chin
rest in front of the CRT and their eye movements were
monitored. When the experimenter determined that the eye
tracker was accurately monitoring the subjects' eye
position, the calibration sequence began. Subjects
sequentially fixated crosses located on the left, right, top
and bottom of the screen. After a successful calibration
had been achieved, subjects were given instructions about
their task. Ten practice trials preceded the experimental
trials in order to demonstrate the "wiggle" to the subject.
Different scenes and objects were used in the practice
trials than in the experimental trials.
A trial began with a fixation cross in the center of
the screen. When the subject was seen to be fixating the
fixation cross, the experimenter began the trial. The scene
appeared on the screen. After 75 ms. one of the objects
moved 1/2 degree visual angle and returned to its original
position 75 ms later. Subjects moved their eyes to the
"wiggled" object and named it as rapidly as possible and the
activation of the voice key terminated the display. The
experimenter recorded the response as correct or incorrect.
The experiment consisted of 256 trials separated into 8
blocks of 32 trials each. A trial block took approximately
15 minutes to complete so the entire experiment spanned
three one hour sessions conducted on consecutive days.
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Subjects were given a 5 minute rest between blocks run on
the same day.
Eye Movement Reduction Criteria
Typically, eye movement researchers have used the term
"fixation" to refer to the period of time the eye is in a
stable position and the term "saccade" to refer to the
period of time the eye is in motion. Use of these terms
implies that there is an unambigious criterion for the
determination of fixations and saccades in the eye movement
record. However, this is not the case. Some criterion must
be established to draw the line between the end of a
fixation and the beginning of a saccade. A variety of
different criteria have been used in the eye movement
literature. In the current experiment, the eye was
considered in motion (saccade) if the position of the eye in
a given millisecond was more than 1/2 degree visual angle
different than the average of the preceding 5 ms. Thus,
small movements, under 1/2 degree, were not considered true
saccades and were included as part of the fixation duration.
Large movements, greater than 1/2 degree were considered
saccades.
Results and Discussion
The primary dependent measure was the time to name the
target object. Eye movement data were collected primarily
to verify that subjects were performing the task as
instructed: that they began a trial fixating the center
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cross and then moved their eyes directly to the wiggled
object. The eye movement data allows one to exclude trials
on which the subject did not move their eyes directly from
the center of the scene to the target object. The eye
movement record also allows one to measure naming time in a
number of different ways. Instead of measuring naming
latency from the beginning of the trial until the voice key
was activated, naming time may also be measured from the
time that the object was initially fixated until the
activation of the voice key. The data from the current
experiment was analyzed two ways: by taking the eye movement
data into account and also by ignoring the eye movement
data. Both will be reported here.
Total Naming Time Analysis
The mean object naming latency of all correctly named
objects can be seen in the Table 1 below. Naming errors
occurred on less than 1% of the trials. The primary goal of
Experiment 1 was to assess the effect of background
information on object naming. To this end, one might want
to compare the consistent background condition directly to
the inconsistent background condition. However, since the
objects were in different locations in these two conditions,
the appropriate measure of the background effect is the
interaction between the meaningfulness of the background and
the consistency of the background. That is, since the
nonsense background conditions were matched to the
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experimental conditions for placement of the objects, a mor
appropriate comparisons are between the meaningful
background conditions and their matched nonsense background
conditions.
Table 1
Mean Object Naming Time Measured from the Beginning of the
Trial in Experiment 1 (in milliseconds)
Consistent Inconsistent
Background Background
Meaningful 1082 1146
Background
Nonsense 1128 1125
Background
Differences -46 +21
Note - Includes all data except for naming errors. No data
have been excluded due to the eye movement record.
The overall naming latency in the experiment was 112 0
ms. As can be seen in Table 1, objects were named 46 ms
faster in the Consistent Background condition than in the
matching Nonsense Background control condition and objects
in Inconsistent scenes were named 21 ms slower than objects
located in the matching Nonsense Background condition. The
interaction between Background Consistency and Background
Meaningfulness was significant, F(l,7) = 7.88, p < .026, MSE
= 1152. There also was a significant main effect of
Consistency, F(l,7) = 31.64, p < .001, MSE = 234.
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In order to evaluate whether the consistent backgrounds
facilitated object identification and whether inconsistent
backgrounds interfered with identification of the target,
simple effects t-tests were computed for the differences
between the experimental conditions and their matching
controls. Both the -46 ms difference between the Consistent
Background condition and its Nonsense Background control and
the 21 ms difference between the Inconsistent Background
condition and its Nonsense Background control were
significant, t(7) =
-2.14, p < .05, (s = 61), and t(7) =
2.24, p < .05, (s = 27), respectively.
To summarize, when considering overall naming time from
the beginning of the trial until the object was named, there
was a significant effect of background consistency on object
naming relative to the nonsense background controls.
Furthermore, from this analysis it appears as though
consistent backgrounds facilitated object identification and
that inconsistent backgrounds interfered with the object
identification process.
Corrected Naming Time Analysis
Criteria for Excluding Trials. The data included in
the following analyses are essentially the same as that
presented above, with the exception that some data were
excluded on the basis of the eye movements. In order for a
trial to be included in these analyses, the subject must
have begun the trial fixating within 1 degree visual angle
of the center fixation cross. In addition, the eye must
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have remained in this center region of the screen until the
wiggle occurred and then the next fixation longer than 50 ms
must have been within 1 degree of visual angle of the target
object. The 1 degree cut-off was chosen because it was
stringent enough to determine unambigiously that the subject
was fixating the target object (and the center of the scene
at the beginning of the trial) and not another object in the
scene, yet loose enough that trials were not excluded due to
minor errors in calibration. The requirement that the eye
move directly from the center to the target object region
with only fixations of less than 50 ms in between was chosen
because it allowed no meaningful fixations on other objects
to intervene between the first fixation and the target
object fixation; however, it does not throw out trials in
which the subject blinked or there was a short temporary
track loss.
Corrected Overall Naming Time . The corrected overall
naming time data after the above cut-offs have been applied
can be seen in Table 2 . The mean naming latency averaged
across conditions was 1109 ms.
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Table 2
Mean Overall Corrected Naming Time in Experiment 1 (in
milliseconds)
Consistent Inconsistent
Background Background
Meaningful 1073
Background
Nonsense 1117
Background
Note - Eliminating trials where the eye did not begin in the
center of the scene, remain in the center of the scene until
after the wiggle, or fixated some other aspect of the scene
for longer than 50 ms. before fixating the target object.
The difference between the Consistent Background
condition and its Nonsense Control was -44 ms and the
difference between the Inconsistent Background condition and
its matching Nonsense Background control was 11 ms. This
interaction was significant F(l,7) = 5.60, p < .048, MSE =
1074. There was also a significant main effect of
Background Consistency, F(l,7) = 11.3, p < .011, MSE = 562.
Simple effects t-tests were conducted to determine whether
the naming time in the Consistent Background condition was
significantly faster than in the Nonsense Background control
and whether the naming in the Inconsistent Background
condition was significantly slower than in its control
condition. The difference between the Consistent Background
and the Nonsense Consistent condition was -44 ms, t(7) = -
2.41, p < .025, (s = 52) and the difference between the
1129
1118
Inconsistent Background condition and its Nonsense
Background control was ii ms, t(7) = 1.28, p > .10.
Thus, the overall pattern of data from this analysis
looks similar to the uncorrected naming analysis with the
exception that in this analysis there is stronger evidence
for facilitation and weaker evidence for interference in
object naming caused by the inconsistent backgrounds.
Naming Time from Fixation of Target Object
. Another
way to conceive of object naming latency would be to use the
time between when the object was actually fixated and when
it was named. The advantage of measuring naming time in this
manner is that it may more truly reflect the processing
required to identify the target object. Table 3 displays
the mean object naming latency, measuring from when the
target was fixated to the end of the trial (triggering of
the voice key)
.
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Table 3
Mean Naming Time Measured from when Target Object
Fixated Until End of Trial in Experiment 1 iin milliseconds)
Consistent
Background
Inconsistent
Background
Meaningful
Background
751 814
Nonsense
Background
798 806
Differences -47 +8
Mean overall naming latency in Table 3 is 792 ms. The
critical interaction between Background Type (meaningful or
nonsense) and Background Consistency was significant, F(l,7)
= 6.17, p < .041, MSE = 984, as was the main effect of
consistency, F(l,7) = 19.6, p < .004, MSE = 517. These
effects are consistent across items as well. In an items
analysis the interaction was significant, F(l,63) = 6.44, p
< .013, as was the main effect of consistency, F(l,63) =
6.35, p < .014.
The difference between the Consistent Background
condition and its matching Nonsense Background control was -
47 ms, which was significant, t(7) = -2.56, p < .025, (s =
52) , and the difference between the Inconsistent Background
condition and the Nonsense control, 8 ms, was not
significant, t < 1.
To summarize, again there is evidence that consistent
backgrounds facilitate the object identification process,
while there is no clear evidence for interference by the
inconsistent backgrounds. Taken as a whole, these different
analyses on the naming time data definitively point toward
the conclusion that there is an effect of background
consistency on the latency to name the target object.
Furthermore, in all analyses there is evidence for
facilitation from the consistent backgrounds and there is
less evidence that inconsistent backgrounds interfere.
The results of the analyses on the naming time data,
taken as a whole, indicate that 1) context does affect the
process of object identification and 2) consistent context
facilitates the object identification process while
inconsistent context interferes little. Thus, the same
basic effects that were obtained in Boyce et al. (1989),
Experiment 3 have been replicated with a different
methodology.
In the introduction, it was suggested that context
effects may not be evident given a longer viewing time.
That is, if the subject has ample time to view the object
that the identification process would work so efficiently
that context would not play a role. The evidence does not
support this view. In this experiment viewing times on the
scenes were approximately 1 second and errors in naming were
less than 1%. Obviously this is enough time for the
background context and the target object to be identified.
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Eye Movement Latency
The final dependent measure from Experiment 1 is the
latency of the first eye movement. This measure is the time
it took subjects to begin an eye movement from the center of
the scene to the wiggled object. It was thought that
differences in this measure might reflect processing of
background information on the first fixation on the scene.
Table 4
Mean Eye Movement Latencies in Experment 1 (in milliseconds)
Consistent Inconsistent
Background Background Average
Meaningful
,
Background 301 293 297
Nonsense
Background 296 289 293
Average 299 291
In Table 4 one can see the mean eye movement latencies
for each of the conditions in Experiment 1. Overall the
mean eye movement latency was 295 ms. The only significant
effect present in these data was a main effect of
Consistency F(l,7) = 7.96, MSE =57, p < .025.
This is a somewhat puzzling result. One might expect,
with this measure, to find an effect of background
meaningfulness. It would seem logical that subjects would
be either faster or slower to move their eyes from center
given a nonsense background. However, there was no
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significant effect of background meaningfulness but there
was an effect of background consistency. Could it really be
the case that subjects can identify whether the objects are
consistent or inconsistent with the background completely on
the first fixation on the scene? It seems likely that there
is a slightly more mundane explanation for the main effect
of consistency found in the eye movement latency data.
Recall that the objects are in somewhat different spatial
locations in the consistent background and inconsistent
background scenes. Although overall the objects are
equidistant from the center of the scene, it seems likely
that something about the placement of the objects in the
scene frame is responsible for this effect. That is, the
location of the objects in the inconsistent backgrounds are
somewhat easier to respond to when the target object
wiggles. Although the effect is significant the absolute
value of the difference is small (8 ms)
.
Since this effect is significant, however, it seems as
though the best measure of the object identification time is
the naming time from when the target object is fixated.
Both of the other two overall measures include the time to
move off the center of the object which is possibly
confounded with the position of the object.
Subsidiary Analyses
Practice Effects . In order to determine whether the
above reported context effects are attenuated over the
course of the experiment the data from this experiment was
divided in half and a three way Analysis of Variance was
performed with first-half/second-half entered as a factor in
the design. Overall, subjects were 86 ms faster in the
second half of the experiment than in the first half. This
difference was significant, F(l,7) = 43.32, p < .001.
However, no other factor interacted with practice. That is,
although the overall naming time was faster in the second
half of the experiment, the difference between the
Consistent Background condition and the Inconsistent
Background condition stayed roughly the same (Consistent -
Inconsistent in the first half = -51 ms. Consistent -
Inconsistent in the second half = -71 ms.). However, since
the order of the trials was completely randomized across the
experiment, this analysis is confounded with items.
Distance Effects . Another subsidiary analysis of
interest is whether the context effect stays the same
whether or not the target object is close to the center of
the scene or far away from the center of the scene. The
items were divided into two groups: a near group, which was
approximately 3 degrees visual angle from the center, and a
far group, which were approximately 7.5 degrees from the
center. The difference between the Consistent Background
condition and the Inconsistent Background condition in the
near was only -8 ms, while the same comparision for the far
items was -212 ms. Furthermore, the interaction between
background consistency and background type (either
meaningful or nonsense) was not significant for the near
items, F(l,7) =
.06, p < .79, while this interaction was
significant for the far items, F(l,7) = 9.35, p < .018.
From this it seems reasonable to conclude that distance of
the target object from the center does play a role in the
degree to which context will affect identification.
However, this analysis is somewhat confounded with object
since each object does not occur in both near and far
locations. Also, some of the cell means in the control
conditions appear odd, probably due to the small sample
size.
Correlation between Consistency Effect and Independent
Ratings . The purpose of this analysis was to determine how
well the obtained consistency effect covaried with how
predictable the object was from context. A separate group
of subjects was given verbal descriptions of the scenes and
then the names of the objects that appeared in the scenes.
These subjects were instructed to rate the object on a scale
from 1 to 6, with 1 meaning very unlikely to occur in the
scene and 6 meaning very likely to occur in the scene.
These ratings for each item were then correlated with the
consistency effect for that item (Background Consistent -
Background Inconsistent) . The correlation between these
ratings and the consistency effect was relatively low, r =
.20, but marginally significant, p < .10.
It had been previously thought that context effects
would be evident only when the objects are highly
predictable from the context. This result indicates that
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context affects object identification even when the object
is only plausible in the context, not highly predictable
from the context.
In summary, consistent scene context facilitates the
object identification process. Furthermore, there is little
evidence that the inconsistent scene context interferes with
object identification. Objects located close to the
original fixation are less affected by context. Presumably
this is because when the target object is so near, it is
identified in parallel with the background. Identification
of the target in this case may be completed before the
identification of the background information. Finally, it
has been found that although there is a moderate correlation
between an object's predictability and its context effect,
this by no means accounts for the context effect completely.
That is, it appears as though objects only need to be in a
plausible context for facilitation to occur, not a highly
predictive context. This result mirrors the results of
Boyce et al. (1989).
Conclusion
These data considered together with previous research
with these scenes indicate that the background information
is certainly processed early enough to facilitate object
identification. In fact, results from the t-scope
experiments suggest that the meaning of the background can
be extracted in a 150 ms view of the scene. The current
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study, however, is not diagnostic about the time course of
background information acquisition. It could be that the
background information was obtained primarily on the first
fixation on the center of the screen and then subsequently
ignored. Or it could be the case that information
concerning the background is continuously processed
throughout the duration of the scene viewing. The time
course of background information utilization is the question
the second experiment attempted to address.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 2
Introduction
So far it has been demonstrated that scene context does
facilitate object identification even with relatively long
viewing times. The evidence from Experiment 1 and the
evidence from previous scene research with shorter viewing
durations suggests that scene context information is
extracted quite early in scene viewing. In fact, the
evidence so far may lead one to suggest that the first stage
of scene processing is the extraction of global scene
meaning and processing shifts to the objects contained
within the scene only when that stage is complete. The
purpose of Experiment 2 was to test claims about the time
course of contextual information utilization.
Loftus (Loftus and Mackworth, 1978; Loftus, 1983) has
suggested that the scene context is identified on the first
fixation, and this guides subsequent scene processing.
Specifically, he claims that the activation of the correct
schema for the scene allows one to determine the likelihood
of occurence of the objects located in the scene. Then the
eyes are guided to objects that have a low probability of
occurring in the scene.
However, evidence for this view that scene context is
acquired during the first fixation comes, not from his eye
movement research, but from conclusions drawn about t-scope
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research. He argues that if context effects can be
demonstrated when the scene has been viewed for only 150 ms
then contextual information must be extracted during the
first 150 ms of scene viewing. While it is true that
information about the context of the scene can be accessed
in 150 ms (as evidenced by the t-scope research) this does
not necessarily argue that given longer viewing time all of
the needed contextual information is extracted in the first
150 ms.
If Loftus is correct and all the relevant contextual
information is extracted during the first fixation on the
scene, then the presence of context information on
subsequent fixations on the scene should be relatively
unimportant. Experiment 2 was a test of this claim. In
this experiment the background information present on the
first fixation of the scene changed contingent on the
position of the subject's eye. That is, the type of context
varied from the first fixation to the second fixation on the
scene in an attempt to identify when during scene viewing
context information is utilized.
Method
Subj ects
Nine University of Massachusetts graduate and
undergraduate students participated in the experiment for
payment. Subjects were paid $25 dollars upon the completion
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of the experiment for a total of 4 hours of participation.
None of these subjects had participated in Experiment 1.
Stimuli
The scenes were exactly the same as those used in
Experiment 1. However, not all of the target objects from
the first experiment were tested in the current experiment.
In order to reduce the number of trials in this experiment,
three target objects were chosen for each scene instead of
four as in the previous experiment. (Thus, two objects were
not cued from each scene.) The decision about which
additional object to exclude was based on a number of
criteria: a) if subjects had difficulty naming it in
Experiment 1; b) because the voice key was unresponsive to
the name in the first experiment; and c) if the object was
extremely close to the center. The latter criterion was
invoked to ensure that the saccade time would be
sufficiently long to allow for completion of the display
change. These objects were not eliminated from the scenes;
they just were not cued at any time during the experiment.
Design
The background information was either consistent,
inconsistent or nonsense on the first fixation in the center
of the scene and was either consistent, inconsistent, or
nonsense on second fixation on the scene. Because the
objects were located in different places in the scenes in
the consistent and inconsistent backgrounds, it was not
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possible to directly change a consistent background into an
inconsistent background (or vice versa) in a given trial.
Instead, all of the comparisons had to be made against the
relevant nonsense background control conditions. This
resulted in the eight conditions shown in Table 5.
Table 5
Conditions of Experiment 2
First
Background Type
Second
Background Type Label
a) Consistent Consistent BC/BC
b) Consistent Nonsense BC/NBC
c) Nonsense Consistent NBC/BC
d) Nonsense Nonsense NBC/NBC
e) Inconsistent Inconsistent BI/BI
f) Inconsistent Nonsense BI/NBI
g) Nonsense Inconsistent NBI/BI
h) Nonsense Nonsense NBI/NBI
Conditions a,d,e, and h, where the same scene was
present on the first and second fixations on the scene, were
essentially replications of the conditions of Experiment 1.
However, for purposes of control, display changes were
enacted with these four conditions as well. There might
have been some visual disruption associated with changing
the background, even though the change occured during the
saccades. Therefore, display changes were carried out on
100% of the trials. In the above four conditions where the
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content of the background remained the same across the two
fixations, the second version of the background was reduced
in size by 10%. It was hoped that this minor size change
would cause similar surface disruptions as in the four other
conditions.
Each of the 48 target objects appeared in all eight
conditions, resulting in 384 trials per subject. The
presentation of the trials was randomized across the entire
experiment. The set of 384 randomized trials were divided
into 8 trial blocks of 48 trials a piece. Subjects took
four one-hour sessions to complete the experiment.
Apparatus
The equipment used in Experiment 2 was exactly the same
as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure of this experiment was similar to that of
Experiment 1. The only difference was the display change
that occurred during each trial in this experiment. The
display was changed when the subject began an eye movement
off the center of the scene. When subject's eyes crossed an
imaginary boundary 1 degree around the fixation cross the
currently displayed background was removed from the screen
and a second background was plotted on the CRT. This change
of backgrounds was accomplished within 10 ms, which was
faster than the duration of a typical saccade. Due to the
suppression of visual information processing during
saccades, the subject did not see the display change
occurring. When the subject's eye landed on the target
object, the object was now in a different context than when
the trial began. The voice key was triggered when the
subject named the target object and this terminated the
entire display.
Results and Discussion
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to investigate the time
course of context processing. Varying whether or not a
consistent, inconsistent or nonsense context was present on
the first, second or both fixations seemed a reasonable way
to investigate this question. The questions of interest
were whether a) all relevant contextual information is
processed early in scene viewing or, b) whether contextual
processing continues in parallel with the identification of
the target object. As with the previous experiment,
comparisons cannot be made between Consistent Background
conditions and Inconsistent Background conditions because
the objects were in somewhat different locations in the two
types of backgrounds. All comparisons must be made against
the appropriate nonsense background condition.
As with Experiment 1, there were a number of ways to
measure naming time and also many ways to decide which
trials to exclude. In Experiment 1 there were few
differences between the various measures. In this
experiment, only one measure of naming time will be
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reported, although the other measures were computed. Again
no differences between the measures were found, so the
naming times reported here were measured from when the
target object was fixated until the target was named. A
trial was included in this analysis if the subject a) began
the trial fixating within 1 degree of the center fixation
cross and b) eventually fixated the target object.
Table 6
Mean Naming Time in Experiment 2 (in milliseconds)
Background on 2nd Fixation
Consistent Nonsense
Background Background
(BC) (NBC)
Consistent
Background Background 663 682
on 1st (BC)
Fixation
Nonsense
Background 684 673
(NBC)
Background on 2nd Fixation
Inconsistent Nonsense
Background Background
(BI) (NBI)
Inconsistent
Background Background 724 702
on 1st (BI)
Fixation
Nonsense
Background 732 717
(NBI)
Note - Naming time measured from when target object was
fixated until target object was named.
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The means for the eight conditions can be seen in Table
6. The overall naming time averaged across conditions in
Experiment 2 was 697 ms. Subjects made errors in naming the
target object less than 1% of the time.
Overall, a context effect can be seen in the data. The
conditions where an inconsistent background was present
(BI/BI, BI/NBI, NBI/BI) resulted in longer naming times than
the consistent background conditions (BC/BC, BC/NBC,
NBC/BC)
,
719 ms vs. 676 ms, respectively. The main effect
of background consistency was significant, F(l,8) = 47.7, p
< .0003. Furthermore, the context effect in this experiment
(BC/BC - BI/BI, a 61 ms difference) was about the same in
magnitude as the context effect in Experiment 1 (63 ms) . A
major problem with the data, however, is that a difference
was found between the NBC/NBC condition and the NBI/NBI
condition (a 44 ms advantage for NBC) and this difference
was significant t(8) = 3.14, p < .05, (s = 42). In
Experiment 1 no difference was found between these two
conditions. Theoretically, these should be equal because
there should have been no consistent or inconsistent
interpretation of the nonsense backgrounds with respect to
the target object. There were no other significant effects.
The consistency effect found with the Nonsense
Background conditions makes any of the other comparisons
hard to interpret. For example, it could be the case that
the BC/BC condition and the BC/NBC condition were not
significantly different from one another because there was
no additional advantage when the consistent background was
58
present on the second fixation. This would argue that
background information is acquired only during the first
fixation on the scene. However, these two conditions may be
the same because for some reason the nonsense backgrounds
conveyed meaning about the scene context and so performance
in the BC/NBC condition was the same as in the BC/BC
condition.
It may be that the reason context effects were found
with the nonsense controls has to do with the nature of the
design of this experiment. In all cases where the
background information changed in content (BC/NBC, NBC/BC.
BI/NBI, NBI/BI) the change was between a meaningful
background and the nonsense background that was a distortion
of the meaningful background. It could be that over the
course of the experiment subjects began to learn this
pairing. The result of this would be that the nonsense
backgrounds would no longer be meaningless, but would be
interpreted as a version of the original background. For
example, perhaps the nonsense version of the street
background was no longer a meaningless context but instead
represented the "messed up version of the street scene" to
the subjects. A few of the subjects voluntarily expressed
this strategy at the end of the experiment.
If this learning explanation were the cause of the
difference between the nonsense conditions, then doing an
analysis of practice effects should reveal different
patterns of data at the beginning and end of the experiment.
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That is, if subjects were learning the pairing between the
nonsense scenes and the meaningful scenes then perhaps there
should be no difference between the nonsense controls in the
beginning of the experiment. Unfortunately, since the order
of trials was completely randomized across the experiment
any practice analysis will be confounded by item effects.
One way to analyze the effect of practice on this
difference between the control conditions was to simply
divide the experiment into two halves. The first set of
four trial blocks makes up the first half and the second set
of four trial blocks makes up the second half. The
difference between the NBC/NBC and the NBI/NBI conditions in
the first block was 54 ms and in the second block was 60 ms.
This does not support my contention that subjects learned
the pairings over the course of the experiment. However,
one must keep in mind that since trials were presented in a
completely randomized order, this analysis is confounded
with items.
Perhaps a better way to assess practice effects would
be to analyze only the data from the first experience with
each target object for each subject. In this way, hopefully
some of the item effects could be controlled for. However,
this results in a very small number of trials. Therefore,
means were computed counting only the first time the subject
saw a particular target object in the consistent backgrounds
and the first time they saw the target in the inconsistent
backgrounds. Since order of items was not conterbalanced
across condition it resulted in a somewhat unequal N per
condition. The results of this analysis were not much more
successful than the previous practice analysis. While a
difference between the nonsense backgrounds still exists
(NBC/NBC was 35 ms faster than NBI/NBI)
,
the difference is
smaller than the overall difference.
To summarize, there is not very strong evidence for the
proposal that subjects learned the pairings between the
meaningful backgrounds and nonsense backgrounds. However,
the above practice analyses were all confounded in one way
or another. The fact remains that context effects were
found with the nonsense backgrounds (in contrast to
Experiment 1) and this made other differences (or lack of)
in the experiment impossible to interpret.
One interesting facet of this experiment was the number
of times subjects reported an awareness of a scene change.
Scene backgrounds changed on 100% of the trials. On 50% of
the trials this change was minor (only a size change) and on
the remaining 50% of the trials the change was major (change
in the meaning of the scene) . When asked at the end of the
experiment whether they noticed these changes, subjects
drastically underestimated the percentage of times a change
occurred. Most subjects thought the backgrounds had changed
on 10-25% of the trials indicating that they were unaware of
the display change on a large percentage of the trials.
In summary, because of the problems with the control
conditions in this experiment, little can be concluded from
these data. While the context effect found in Experiment 1
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was replicated, we have learned little about the time c
of contextual information processing. Experiment 3 was
conducted to remedy this.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT 3
Introduction
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to evaluate the
questions about time course of contextual processing set out
in Experiment 2. Experiment 2 failed to illuminate the time
course issue because the Nonsense Background Control
conditions also showed a context effect. For this reason,
better control conditions were needed*
A decision was made to use a grid background instead of
the nonsense backgrounds to serve as controls for the
differences in object location between the consistent and
inconsistent scenes. The grid was a neutral background
which conveyed no semantic or depth information. The major
advantage of the grid was that no meaning could possibly be
ascribed to it. Therefore, any observed difference between
the "consistent" and "inconsistent" grid conditions would be
due to the somewhat different spatial locations of the
objects in these two conditions.
The major disadvantage of using the grid instead of the
nonsense backgrounds is that the grid probably does not
represent a neutral baseline upon which to measure
facilitation versus interference. The grid differs from the
meaningful backgrounds in many visual characteristics. For
example, it contains no depth information and appears as a
visually regular field, instead of a meaningless background.
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For these reasons it was not possible with this experiment
to determine whether consistent backgrounds facilitate
object identification or whether inconsistent backgrounds
interfere with object identification. However, information
about the utilization of background information over time
should be available from this experiment.
Method
Subjects
Eight undergraduate students participated in this
experiment. Many of the students attended other
universities and were spending the summer in Amherst. Upon
completion of the experiment subjects were paid $30 for
approximately 4 hours of participation.
Stimuli
The consistent and inconsistent backgrounds and the
objects were exactly the same as were used in Experiment 2.
However, the nonsense backgrounds were not used in this
experiment and were replaced by Grid Backgrounds. The grid
was constructed from twelve regularly spaced horizontal
lines and twelve vertical lines. This grid background
resembled a piece of graph paper. Objects were superimposed
on the grid background and the portions of the grid that
were located "behind" the objects were deleted. The
resulting scene looked like randomly placed objects in a
graph paper background.
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Design
The design of Experiment 3 was virtually identical to
Experiment 2* Subjects named each target object in each of
the eight conditions shown in Table 7.
Table 7
Conditions of Experiment 3
Background
on Fixation 1
Background
on Fixation 2 Label
a) Consistent Consistent BC/BC
b) Consistent Grid BC/Gr
c) Grid Consistent Gr/BC
d) Grid Grid Gr/Gr
e) Inconsistent Inconsistent BI/BI
f) Inconsistent Grid BI/Gr
g) Grid Inconsistent Gr/BI
h) Grid Grid Gr/Gr
The only difference between conditions d and h (both
labelled Gr/Gr) was that the objects were located in
somewhat different positions within the two-dimensional
frame of the scene. If performance differs in these two
conditions it must be due to this location difference since
they have exactly the same grid background. As a result of
having this measure of object location differences,
comparisions could be made directly between the Consistent
Background conditions and the Inconsistent Background
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conditions, taking into account the effect of target
location.
As in Experiment 2, the same 48 target objects were
cued in each of the eight conditions for each subject. This
resulted in 384 trials over the entire experiment. These
384 trials were divided into eight blocks of 48 trials. It
generally took four one hour sessions for a subject to
complete all eight blocks.
The only other difference in design from Experiment 2
was that trials were no longer completely randomized across
the experiment. Instead, the order of trials was
counterbalanced in the following manner: Each block of 48
trials consisted of one exposure for each target. The
condition in which this target appeared was counterbalanced
across subjects. Within the block of 48 trials the order
was random. Thus, a practice analysis, comparing the first
half of the experiment with the second half, would no longer
be confounded by having different sets of items in the two
halves
.
Apparatus and Procedure
The apparatus and procedure were exactly the same as in
Experiment 2
.
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Results and Discussion
Naming Time
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to determine whether
background information is utilized from only the first
fixation on a scene or from both fixations on the scene.
The primary measure was again object naming time. The data
shown in Table 5 is the object naming time in Experiment 3
measured from when the target object was fixated. Criteria
for including a trial were exactly the same as in Experiment
2. The subject had to a) be fixating the center region of
the scene when the trial began (within 1 degree of the
center) and b) eventually fixate within one degree of the
target object before naming it. Also, as before, trials
where a naming error occurred were also not included.
Naming errors happened very infrequently, less than 1% of
the time.
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Table 8
Mean Naming Time in Experiment 3 ^in milliseconds)
Background
on 1st
Fixation
Consistent
Background
(BC)
Grid
(Gr)
Background on 2nd Fixation
Consistent
Background
(BC)
722
733
Grid
(Gr)
720
741
Background
on 1st
Fixation
Background on 2nd Fixation
Inconsistent
Background
(BI)
Inconsistent
Background
(BI)
Grid
(Gr)
790
764
Grid
(Gr)
766
741
Note - Naming time measured from when target object was
fixated until target object was named.
The average overall naming time in Experiment 3 was 747
ms. As can be seen in Table 8 naming time in the control
conditions (both labelled Gr/Gr) was exactly the same (741
ms) . This indicated that there was no effect of the spatial
location of the target objects. Therefore it was reasonable
to make the direct comparisions between the cells in the top
of the table, the Consistent conditions and the cells in the
bottom of the table, the Inconsistent conditions. The
difference between the Consistent Background (BC/BC) and
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Inconsistent Background (BI/BI) conditions was -68 ms.
Objects were named faster when they were located in the
conistent backgrounds than when they were in the
inconsistent backgrounds. This difference was significant,
t(7) = 7.4, p < .005, (s = 26). This effect replicated the
findings of Experiments 1 and 2.
To evaluate the effect of background information on the
first fixation on the scene, naming times can be compared in
the BC/Gr condition against naming time in the BI/Gr
condition. Subjects were 4 6 ms faster to name the target
object when a consistent background was present on the first
fixation than if an inconsistent background was present on
the first fixation. This difference was significant t(7) =
4.3, p < .005, (s = 30)
.
The comparision between the Gr/BC condition and the
Gr/BI condition is one indication of the role of background
information on the second fixation. Object located in
consistent backgrounds on the second fixation only were
named 31 ms faster than object located in an inconsistent
background on the second fixation only. This difference was
significant, t(7) = 3.2, p < .025, (s = 27). Thus, the
results of this set of comparisons indicated that a)
background information affected object identification most
when present for the entire trial, b) background information
can be acquired from the first fixation on the scene and c)
background information was also acquired during the second
fixation on the scene.
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Even though there was no difference between the two
Grid Background Controls an argument could be made that
these conditions should still be included in the
comparisons. For this reason, somewhat more complicated
comparisons were performed on the data. Since the
difference between the grid conditions can be taken as a
measure of the effect of object location it would be
reasonable to assess the effects of interest by comparing
the consistent and inconsistent conditions minus any effect
of the object location. Specifically, if one wanted to
assess the role of background information on the first
fixation the appropriate computation would be (BC/Gr -
BI/Gr) - (Gr/Gr - Gr/Gr) . The first term in the equation
represents the direct comparison between the consistent and
inconsistent conditions and the second term represents the
difference due to object location. The results of this
comparison were very like those reported above. The effect
of background consistency when the background was present
for the entire trial, (BC/BC - BI/BI) - (Gr/Gr - Gr/Gr), was
significant, t(7) = 6.5, p < .005. The effect of background
on the first fixation of the scene, (BC/Gr - BI/Gr) - (Gr/Gr
- Gr/Gr), was also significant, t(7) = 2.5, p < .025.
Finally, the effect of background on the second fixation,
(Gr/BC - Gr/BI) - (Gr/Gr - Gr/Gr), was also significant,
t(7) = 2.1, p < .05.
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Table 9
Mean Differences between Consistent and Inconsistent
Conditions in Experiment 3 (in milliseconds)
Background on Second Fixation
Meaningful Grid
Background
on
First
Fixation
Meaningful
Grid
-68
-31
-46
0
Mean -50 -23
Table 9 shows the differences between the means of
Consistent and Inconsistent conditions shown in Table 8
(i.e. the efffects discussed above) . The upper left entry
in Table 9 (-68 ms) is the difference between BC/BC and
BI/BI. Similarly, the upper right entry (-46 ms) is the
difference between BC/Gr - BI/Gr, etc. Another way to test
the effect of background on the second fixation would be to
test for differences in the marginals in Table 9. This test
would indicate the difference between the average
consistency effect with meaningful backgrounds and the
average consistency effect with grid backgrounds on the
second fixation. Another way to represent this comparison
is [ [ (BC/BC-BI/BI) + Gr/BC-Gr/BI]/2] - [ (BC/Gr-BI/Gr) +
(Gr/Gr-Gr/Gr) ]/2] , where the first term in brackets is the
average consistency effect in the conditions where a
meaningful background was present on fixation 2 and the
second bracketed term represents the average consistency
effect when a grid was present on fixation 2. This
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difference, a 27 ms advantage for meaningful backgrounds,
was significant, t(7) = 3.67, p < .01. Thus, overall there
was an effect of background type (either meaningful or grid)
on the second fixation on the scene. By comparing the upper
two entries in Table 9, one can assess the role of the
second background given that a meaningful background was
present on the first fixation. This comparison, (BC/BC -
BI/BI) - (BC/Gr - BI/Gr) , was marginally significant, t =
1.52, .05 < p < .10. The comparison between the lower two
entries on Table 9, a difference of 31 ms, tests the effect
of the second background type given a grid on the first
fixation. This comparison has already been reported above,
and was significant, t(7) = 2.1, p < .05. Thus, overall
there was a significant effect of background type on the
second fixation (27 ms) ; a marginal effect if the background
on the first was meaningful (22 ms) and a significant effect
if the background on the first was meaningless (31 ms)
.
Furthermore, the difference between this 22 ms effect and
the 31 ms effect was not significant.
These results, taken together, indicate that scene
backgrounds on the second fixation do affect object
identification. The above analyses demonstrated that,
although the effect of second background was slightly less
given that a grid was presented on the first fixation, this
was not significantly different than if a grid had been
presented on the first fixation.
The above analyses all indicated that the background
affects processing on both fixations on the scene. In fact.
the data appear roughly additive. The effect of background
information during the entire trial (68 ms) is almost the
sum of the effect of background information on the first
fixation (46 ms) and the effect of background information on
the second fixation (31 ms)
.
The fact that background information was acquired
during the first fixation on the scene is not a surprising
result. Context effects have been found when the scene has
been presented only for brief durations (see Boyce et al.,
1989; Biederman et al, 1982). Hence, it was known that
processing of background information could occur very
quickly.
The more surprising finding in the current experiment
was the effect of background information on the second
fixation. Loftus (1983; see also Loftus and Mackworth,
1978) has proposed that during the first fixation on a scene
the contextual information is processed and that later
fixations on the scene are specifically for the purpose of
identifying the objects. This model invokes some sort of
attentional mechanism that, metaphorically, could be thought
of as a spotlight. During the first fixation on the scene,
the attentional spotlight is quite large, encompassing most
of the scene. During this time large-grained visual
information (perhaps corresponding to the scene background)
is acquired. After the context is identified, the eyes move
to an object located in the scene. At this time the
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spotlight narrows to focus all resources on identifying the
fixated object.
The results from this experiment indicate that this
model is not correct if it assumes that scene background
information is not processed after the first fixation. In
fact, this experiment indicates that scene backgrounds must
be identified at some level on the first fixation (or there
should not have been context effects on fixation 1) and that
further processing of the background continues during the
second fixation. Perhaps the background is identified at a
very global level on the first fixation and then further
background processing results in a more detailed
representation of the background.
This result (the effect of background on fixation 2)
also adds to our knowledge about information acquisition and
eye movements during scene viewing. First, it can be
concluded that the region of the scene that is fixated is
not necessarily the only region that is being processed.
That is, even while fixating the target object, subjects
must have been acquiring additional information about the
background. Since the subjects were instructed to name the
target object as fast as possible, however, one would think
that the best strategy would be to focus all resources on
the target object once it has been located and ignore the
background. The fact that subjects accumulated background
information from the second fixation on the scene indicates
that this strategy was not used.
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Second, this result suggests that information about the
context gained on one fixation on the scene can be carried
across an intervening saccade. One would not have expected
to get an additional benefit from having the context present
for the entire trial if this were not the case. However,
this experiment can make no claim about the nature of the
code in which information is integrated across subsequent
fixations (i.e. whether it is stored in a visual or semantic
code)
•
To summarize, the findings of this experiment replicate
the previously found context effect. Furthermore they
indicate that background information is acquired during both
fixations on the scene. These results will be discussed
further in the general discussion.
Eye Movement Latency
A second dependent measure that was included in the
data record was subjects' time to respond to the wiggle by
moving their eyes off the center of the scene. The mean eye
movement latencies for each condition can be seen in Table
10. Averaging across conditions, the mean eye movement
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Table 10
Mean Eye Movement Latency in Experiment 3 Xin milliseconds)
Background
on 1st
Fixation
Background on 2nd Fixation
Consistent
Background
(BC)
Grid
(Gr)
Consistent
Background
(BC)
Grid
(Gr)
311
288
307
290
Background
on 1st
Fixation
Background on 2nd Fixation
Inconsistent
Background
(BI)
Inconsistent
Background
(BI)
Grid
(Gr)
312
284
Grid
(Gr)
311
285
latency was 299 ms. A three factor analysis of variance
conducted on this data indicated that there was only a main
effect of background type on the first fixation F(l,7) =
268.3, p < .00002). That is, if the background on the first
fixation was a grid subjects moved their eyes to the wiggled
object faster than if the background on the first fixation
was meaningful.
One explanation for this result is that since the
visual information in the grid background condition was
considerably less complex than the meaningful background
conditions, there was less information to process on the
first fixation when the grid background was present. This,
in turn, would allow subjects to register the wiggle faster.
Practice Analysis
As with the previous two experiments an analysis of the
effect of practice was conducted. In this analysis, as
before, the data from the first four trial blocks
constitutes the first half of the experiment and data from
the last four trial blocks makes up the second half of the
experiment. Because of the counterbalancing of item and
order in this experiment, however, practice effects are no
longer confounded with item effects. The results from a
four way analysis of variance indicated an 85 ms effect of
practice (F(l,7)= 191.6, p < .001). No other factors
interacted with practice. Thus, the effects in the second
half of the experiment were exactly the same as in the first
half.
Items Analysis
The purpose of doing an items analysis on the data was
to determine if the effects reported above in the naming
time section are the same if one collapses across subject
and analyzes by item. Specifically, it was of interest
whether or not the three important comparisons (BC/BC vs.
BI/BI, BC/Gr vs. BI/Gr, and Gr/BC vs. Gr/BI) would be
significant across items. That is, were the observed
effects due to a subset of the items included in the
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experiment or are the effects reliable for all items?
Simple effects t-tests were conducted on the naming time
data reported in the above section, but collapsed across
subject, looking at items. There were significant
differences between the BC/BC condition and the BI/BI
condition, t(47) =4.3, p < .005 and between BC/Gr and
BI/Gr conditions, t(47) = 2.64, p < .025. However, the
effect of background on the second fixation (Gr/BC vs.
Gr/BI) was only marginally significant, t(47) =1.82, p <
.10. Thus, the principal effects in the experiment were
quite consistent over the various target objects.
In summary. Experiment 3 answered questions about the
time course of background information acquisition during
scene viewing. Specifically, background information was
acquired on both the first and second fixations on a scene.
The ramifications of the findings for models of scene
perception will be discussed in the General Discussion.
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CHAPTER 5
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Introduction
The three experiments reported here indicated that a)
context facilitates the object identification process, b)
scene backgrounds are one locus of these context effects, c)
background information is acquired during the first fixation
on a scene and d) background information is also acquired
during the second fixation on a scene. The results of these
experiments lay to rest the concerns that the prior research
using brief exposures overestimated the degree to which
context affects object identification. The present "wiggle"
paradigm allowed subjects ample time to view the target
object and context effects were still found. In addition,
the results of Experiment 3 indicate that a strictly serial
model of scene processing (as proposed by Loftus, 1983) is
also not correct. Background information was acquired on
both fixations on the scene. These results have
ramifications for models of scene processing and suggest the
outline of a model of scene processing that addresses the
issues of: a) the mechanism of the facilitation; b) time
course of contextual information acquisition; and c) the
role of eye movements in scene viewing.
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Mechanism of Facilitation
As was outlined in the introduction, there are at least
two possible mechanisms of facilitation: Object to Object
Priming and Schema Activation. Each of these mechanisms
will be discussed in light of the results of the current
experiments.
Obj ect to Object Priming
The object to object priming hypothesis is that when
related objects occur in scenes together, the identification
of one object facilitates the identification of others.
There are two problems with the object to object priming
hypothesis with regard to this data: a) the formal semantic
nature of the priming relationships and b) the magnitude of
the priming effect.
This hypothesis views the important relationships
between objects to be semantic or associative. That is,
"dog" and "cat" are related by nature of their common
association with one another and "apple" and "orange" are
related because they belong to the same semantic category.
I have argued in the introduction that this definition of
relations is not sufficient to account for scene context
effects. That is, objects that typically co-occur in scenes
may not be semantically or associatively related to one
another. A glance at the Appendix where the objects in the
scenes were listed indicates that most of the objects used
in the current experiments are not strongly related to one
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another under this defininition of relationship. Most
importantly, Boyce et al. (1989) Experiment 2 investigated
the influence of cohort objects on object identification.
Contrary to the object to object priming hypothesis, the
cohorts had no effect.
The magnitude of the object to object priming effect
found by Henderson et al. (1989) also calls this mechanism
into question. In a naming time experiment similar to the
current experiments (except without scene context) objects
were named 13 ms faster if a related object was fixated
prior to the target than if an unrelated object was fixated
first. Furthermore, this priming effect was found
predominantly when the subjects were given no preview of the
target object. In contrast, across the current three
experiments the average effect of background consistency was
64 ms. That is, objects were named 64 ms faster in the
consistent backgrounds than in the inconsistent backgrounds.
Thus, even if one could demonstrate that an object to object
priming mechanism is at work during scene processing, it
would have a very small effect relative to the effect of
scene backgrounds on object identification. Thus, the bulk
of the evidence suggests that object idenfication is
facilitated by scene backgrounds and that the simple object
to object priming explanation proposed by Henderson et al.
cannot account for these findings.
However, a more sophisticated version of the object to
object priming hypothesis may be able to account for this
data. If one assumes that backgrounds are large objects and
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that the associations between objects can be episodic as
well as semantic then the object to object priming
hypothesis may be able to account for this data. However,
this model still leaves the lack of cohort effects to be
explained. That is, this model would have to also assume
some greater strength of relationship between the
backgrounds and objects than between the objects that co-
occur in the scenes.
Schema Activation
A schema activation account of the present paradigm is
as follows: Identification of the background leads to the
activation of the appropriate schema for the scene. Once
this superordinate node in the schema is activated, it
facilitates the identification of objects likely to fit into
the context; that is, object representations that are
connected to this superordinate scene node.
While this account seems reasonable, it raises the
question of how this schema activation actually facilitates
object identification. It seems as though there are two
ways that this facilitation can occur: a) background
identification could speed up further perceptual processing
or b) background indentification could limit the amount of
further perceptual processing necessary. Each of these
possible mechanisms will be discussed.
We know that the rate of visual information acquisition
is not constant. Many things can alter the rate at which
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one can extract visual features. For example, Loftus
(1985; see also Loftus, Nelson and Kallman, 1983) has found
that the intensity of the stimulus display is closely
related to the speed of acquisition of pictorial
information. T-scope experiments with letters show that
perceptual information is acquired slower from the periphery
than from the fovea (Estes, 1978; Sperling, 1970). Perhaps
context affects object identification by speeding up the
rate at which visual information is acquired. That is, once
the appropriate schema has been activated, perceptual
processes speed up and object information is accumulated at
a faster rate. The largest problem with this mechanism is
that it is not clear how the higher order processes can
"feed back" and alter the mechanics of perception. For
example, it is hard to imagine that higher order processes
affect the speed at which photochemicals in the retina work.
Perhaps the feature acquisition is somehow speeded in the
primary visual cortex, but it is still not clear how
semantic information can be directed back to affect these
processes.
It seems more plausible that scene context limits the
amount of perceptual processing necessary for identification
to occur. That is, when the appropriate schema is activated
in memory, activation is spread to the related subordinate
object nodes. If one assumes that there is some threshold
that must be reached for object identification to occur, one
could think of this additional activation to the object node
as equivalent to lowering its threshold. In either case,
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less input from the perceptual system is necessary for
threshold to be reached. This model does not assume context
modulates the rate at which perceptual information accrues.
For example, when the kitchen background is identified,
activating the "kitchen node" in memory, activation is
spread to the related concepts "toaster", "glass", etc.
When visual information about a toaster is input into the
system it takes less time for the toaster node in memory to
reach threshold. Thus, the name TOASTER can be said
quickly. This mechanism is similar to that proposed by
McClelland and Rumelhart (1981) . The important aspect of
this explanation is that it does not require that perceptual
processes are altered by context, only that one can "act"
earlier on the basis of less advanced perceptual processing.
This mechanism would also predict that there would be
little or no interference in the Inconsistent Background
condition. If the background is identified as a bathroom,
instead of a kitchen, one would expect that toaster would
not be facilitated, since bathroom is not connected to
toaster in memory and one would not expect this to
interefere. In the inconsistent background scenes, object
representations were still facilitated by the context, it
was just not the objects that were pictured in the scene.
That is, in the bathroom background with the kitchen objects
(Inconsistent Condition) activation from bathroom node would
have spread activation to plunger, toilet paper, etc. This
activation would not have affected speed of recognition for
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toaster which was not facilitated or interfered with by the
identification of the bathroom background. The results of
Boyce et al. (1989) Experiment 2 would support this
hypothesis. It was found that the only predictor of context
effects was the relationship between the target object and
the scene background.
There is one result from the current experiments that
does not fit very well with this schema explanation. In
Experiment 1, the scene consistency effect was not highly
correlated with ratings of how well the objects fit in the
scene context. An independent group of subjects rated the
objects for their degree of consistency with the backgrounds
and the correlation of this measure with the difference
between identification in the Consistent and Inconsistent
conditions was only 0.2. If the schema view was correct
then one would have expected this correlation to be higher.
That is, the more predictable the object was from the
background, the more activated that object node should have
been. This is a somewaht puzzling result in light of the
manner in which these scenes were created. In order to
generate the ideas for the scenes, an independent group of
subjects listed objects that they thought were most likely
to occur in the backgrounds. This is the typical way of
examining the contents of peoples' schemas (see Handler,
1984) .
This result does not necessarily invalidate a schema
organization, but it may suggest that schema activation is a
more interactive process. That is, it is possible that the
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scene background provides initial access to a general schema
for the context, such as "room", or even "bedroom", and at
the same time partial identification of the target object
facilitates another, more specific schema, for example,
"child's room". This activation spreading down from a more
global scene schema and up through partial identification of
the target object may result in greater activation for the
more specific schema. The target object may be highly
predictable with respect to this more specific schema, but
only plausible in the more generic "bedroom" schema. Since
the ratings were obtained by giving subjects generic labels
for the scenes, such as "bedroom scene", the moderate
correlation may not truly reflect the degree to which the
objects were predictable from the background.
The organization of schemas is still not well
understood and their proponents have been widely criticized
because schema theory makes few predictions and because when
it is adapted to account for a wide range of phenomena, many
ad-hoc (and potentially inconsistent) assumptions are made.
I do agree with some of these criticisms. However, the
results of these experiments, taken together with the
previous literature on context effects (Antes, 1977; Antes
et al., 1981; Biederman, 1972; Biederman, Glass and Stacy,
1973; Biederman et al. 1982; Boyce et al, 1989; Friedman,
1979; Loftus et al., 1978), indicate that the relationship
between context and the object identification process is not
a simple associative one.
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No modular semantic network explanation is going to be
able to account for these findings, to the extent that the
relationships in the semantic network are not based on the
probability of co-occurence. The modified version of the
object to object priming hypothesis, which begins to
resemble the schema organization, may be able to account for
the data because backgrounds may function in the network as
large objects. However, the lack of a cohort effect
indicates that the relationship between backgrounds and the
objects likely to occur in them is stronger than the
relationship between the scene objects themselves. Even the
modified object to object priming network cannot account for
this. The hierarchical organization of schemas can account
for these effects. A schema organization that posited
strong connections between the background and the objects
and only weak, or non-existent connections between the
objects best accounts for the data.
Time Course of Context Information Acquisition
The major finding with respect to the time course of
contextual processing was that consistent backgrounds
facilitated object identification on both fixations on the
scene and furthermore, this effect was roughly additive.
This is a somewhat puzzling result if one thinks that
identification of context is an all or nothing process.
That is, how could it be that the background present on the
first fixation was identified enough to facilitate object
identification but then further information extracted on the
87
second fixation led to greater facilitation? There are at
least two mechanisms that could account for the additive
effect of background on both fixations. The first I will
call the "levels of representation" hypothesis and the
second the "neighborhood" hypothesis.
The levels of representation hypothesis holds that
backgrounds are represented in memory at various levels of
specificity. Perhaps there is a node superordinate to
"kitchen" that represents something like "room in a house".
Or, maybe there is a level between "kitchen" and "room in a
house" that we do not have a word for in our language. The
idea here is that there is a more general representation for
the backgrounds' meaning stored in memory. During the first
fixation on the scene, it is this level of representation
that is activated. This activation partially facilicitates
the representations for the objects that could occur in this
scene. During the second fixation on the scene, the
background is processed further and this results in contact
with the more detailed and specific representation for the
background. This also facilitates object identification.
Thus, this hypothesis would argue that there are multiple
levels of representations stored in memory for each scene
and the facilitation for the target object was two sources;
the more general representation and the more specific
representation
.
A second mechanism is the "neighborhood" hypothesis.
Background information acquired on the first fixation on the
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scene could activate more than one schema. Backgrounds that
share many of the same visual characteristics could be
activated by the information acquired on the first fixation.
This would weakly activate objects that are consistent with
the scene background and objects that are consistent with
visually similar backgrounds. During the second fixation on
the scene, additional information about the background is
acquired and this raises the activation for one schema above
that of other schemas. At this point, one interpretation of
the background has been arrived at and this results in
further facilitation for only the objects that are
consistent with this background. This hypothesis holds that
backgrounds and their related objects are only represented
once in memory.
The major difference between the two models is the
following: in the first model only a subset of the objects
eventually activated are activated early in the processing.
In contrast, the second model posits that a larger number of
objects (including inappropriate ones) are activated early
in processing and then are narrowed down further by
additional processing of the background. The data from the
current experiments cannot distinguish between these two
mechanisms. However, they make testable predictions. If
the "neighborhood" mechanism is correct, than having
background information present only on the first fixation on
the scene should result in facilitation for objects that are
unrelated to the current background (but related to a
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visually similar background) as well as facilitating the
correct set of objects.
One interesting aspect of the results of Experiment 3
is that it appears as though processing of the background
information past the first fixation on the scene is
obligatory. That is, even when the target object had been
located and the subject had fixated the target, background
information acquisition continued. This result would argue
for obligatory processing of background to some level of
comprehension. Thus, it appears as though background
information is so important to the process of object
identification that the extraction of meaning from the
background continues even while the target object is being
identified. In the levels of processing hypothesis the
further background processing results in a contact with a
more detailed schema for the scene. According to the
neighborhood hypothesis, this further background processing
on the second fixation results in the elimination of the
activation for visually similar background schemas.
Eye Movements , Covert Attention and Scene Processing
The primary purpose of the current research was to
investigate questions about the role of context in object
identification. However, the results of the current
experiments do add to our knowledge about eye movements,
covert attention and information acquisition in scene
viewing. Specifically, these experiments speak to the
90
questions of extrafoveal information acquisition and
integration of information across saccades.
Perceptual Span and Scene Perception
"Perceptual span" refers to the region of text from
which a reader is acquiring useful information (Rayner,
1975). Rayner (1975) determined that in addition to
acquiring information from the word that is in the fovea,
information to the right of the currently fixated word can
be acquired as well. The quality of this extrafoveal
information varies as a function of its distance from the
fixation point.
Some research has been conducted to determine the size
of the perceptual span in scenes. Saida and Ikeda (1979),
using the moving window technique, concluded that the
perceptual span for scenes was about 50% of the area
surrounding the fixation point. That is, on a given
fixation, useful information was being acquired from about
50% of the scene. Nelson and Loftus (1980) found that
little information about details in the scene a fixation
could be extracted from further than about 1.5 degrees from
fixation.
The current experiments indicated that extrafoveal
information can be extracted from a large region of the
scene. In all of the experiments, the first fixation on the
scene was in the center. These scenes were designed so that
very little useful background information would be provided
foveally when fixating the center of these scenes and there
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was never an object in the center of the scene. Thus, any
background information that was acquired during the first
fixation must have been acquired from extrafoveal
processing. The results from Experiment 3 indicated that
context information was acquired during the first fixation
on the scene.
The fact that context information was acquired
extrafoveally during the first fixation on the scene might
not be too surprising in light of the fact that there was
very little foveal processing to be done in the center of
these scenes. Hence, during the first fixation on the scene
all of one's resources could be devoted completely to
peripheral information extraction. The more surprising
result was the effect of context on the second fixation.
Extrafoveal information was processed even when the target
object was in the fovea.
These data do not indicate the exact size of the
perceptual span but they do indicate that it is larger than
2 degrees. The visual information that conveyed the meaning
of the backgrounds was spread over a large region. In a
separate pilot study, subjects were not able to accurately
identify the background when given only the center 2 degrees
of the scene. Thus, background information acquired on the
first fixation must have been from a region larger than 2
degrees. Similarly, since backgrounds were processed during
the second fixation on the scene and we know that the target
object (approximately 2 degrees in size) resided in the
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fovea at this time, we can conclude that the perceptual span
is considerably larger than two degrees.
In summary, from these results it can be concluded that
a) the size of the perceptual span is large (at the very
least larger than 2 degrees) and b) the size of the
perceptual span does not vary drastically from the first to
the second fixation on the scene.
The fact that background information was acquired
during the fixation on the target object indicates that we
should use caution when employing a measure like fixation
duration as a measure of object identification time. Since
more than the target object was being processed during the
second fixation on the scene, therefore, fixation durations
are likely to reflect not only time to identify the object,
but other factors as well, such as processing of the
context.
Integration of Information Across Saccades
Some kind of information is integrated across saccades,
but the major unresolved question is what kind (level) of
information is undergoing the integration. The bulk of the
evidence from experiments employing text indicates it is not
basic "retinal" information that is integrated but something
more abstract (Rayner, McConkie and Zola 1980; McConkie and
Zola, 1979) . Similar experiments with pictures (Pollatsek,
Rayner and Collins, 1984) found that some sort of abstract
shape information was also integrated across saccades.
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The current experiments indicate that the background
information acquired on one fixation can affect processing
on a subsequent fixation. The major evidence for this comes
from the added advantage of having a consistent scene
background present on both fixations over having it present
on just one of the fixations. Since the advantage of having
a consistent background on both fixations was substantially
greater than having the background present only on the
second fixation on the scene, background information was
integrated across saccades.
The results of Experiment 3 also suggest that the
information integrated across the saccade was not "featural"
information but some higher order code. If integration was
attempted with some visual feature level information one
might expect to get large disruption effects in the
conditions where major changes in the background information
occurred from fixation to fixation. The average naming time
in the four background switching conditions was 746 ms
compared with 749 ms where much smaller changes occurred
(only a size change) . Thus, it appears as though something
more conceptual (i.e. the meaning of the background) was
integrated across successive fixations on the scene. In
summary, the results of the current experiments corroborate
the view that higher order conceptual information is
integrated across saccades.
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Allocation of Covert Attention
There at least two ways in which attention could be
allocated during scene processing. The first, which I have
already discussed, could be termed the "zoom model". in
this view, during the first fixation on a scene, attention
is diffused over the entire visual field. Subsequently, the
spotlight of attention is narrowed to encompass only the
target object. The second model of attention allocation is
one proposed by Henderson, Pollatsek and Rayner (1989) which
they term the sequential attention hypothesis. This model
states that attention is first allocated to the foveal
region, and then after some threshold of identification of
foveal information has been crossed, attention is shifted to
a new region of the visual field.
The results of Experiment 3 seem to rule out the "zoom
model" as proposed by Loftus. It was not the case that the
background information was attended to only during the first
fixation on the scene. This result is somewhat suprising,
given that the zoom strategy seems like an efficient way to
process scene information. Since enough background
information was extracted during the first fixation on the
scene to cause facilitation for the target object, it seems
like it would have been a good strategy to focus all
processing resources on the target object once is had been
located. This is not what happened.
Henderson et al. (1989) also tested the valdity of the
zoom hypothesis. In their experiments (done with arrays of
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objects and not scenes) they found that attention was not
first allocated to all regions of the display, but instead
was allocated in a sequential manner. That is, attention
was first allocated to the foveal object and then allocated
to the object that was to be fixated next. They suggested
that the allocation of attention during scene viewing may
function in the same fashion.
There is some weak evidence in the current experiments
against this sequential attention mechanism. In order to
account for the context effects on the second fixation on
the scene with this mechanism, one would have to propose
that processing of the foveal target object was done first
and then attention was allocated to some other region of the
scene (perhaps somewhere on the background) . It is not
clear that this could account for the results obtained.
First, it would not be effecient to shift attention off the
target object in the current paradigm once it had been
located. Second, it is unclear how context could have an
effect during the second fixation if the background was
attended to only after the target object (foveal region) had
been processed. Thus, this serial mechanism does not seem
to be at work in the current paradigm. Instead it appears
as though during the first two fixations on a scene,
attention is allocated to the entire visual field and this
does not change over the course of the trial. The evidence
from the current experiments thus indicates that neither
simple mechanism — zoom or sequential shift — is an
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adequate model of selective attention during the first few
fixations on a scene.
Conclusion
I have outlined a model of scene perception which
accounts for the results of the three experiments reported
in this dissertation. The model suggests that the
identification of scene backgrounds activates a schema for
the scene stored in memory. Once the top node in the
correct schema has been activated (this node represents the
background) the activation spreads to objects that are
consistent with the background. Because the object nodes
consistent with the background have been partially-
activated, less perceptual information is necessary for the
identification threshold to be reached.
The process of contacting the correct schema is not
necessarily completed in the first fixation. Partial
identification of background information might either a)
make contact with some superordinate, less specified,
representation initially, or b) activate a neighborhood of
related schemas. Further background processing during the
second fixation on the scene results in full activation of
the correct schema. Also, I have argued that the processing
of background information is obligatory until some criterion
of background identification has been reached.
Finally, it seems that the perceptual span for pictures
is large and that extrafoveal information plays an important
role in scene processing. Moreover, the results of
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Experiment 3 suggest that conceptual information from the
background is integrated across saccades.
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APPENDIX
DESCRIPTIONS OF SCENES
Scene name in parentheses indicates scene that was used forbackground inconsistent conditions.
* Indicates non-target object in all experimentsIndicates non-target object in Experiments 2 and 3
.
Scenes and Objects
1
. Bedroom
(Refrigerator)
1. Teddy Bear **
2. Doll
3. Suitcase
4 . Cap
5
. Pennent *
2. Broom Closet
(Desk)
1. Iron **
2
. Scrub Brush
3
. Paper Towels
4 . Bucket
5. Wisk Broom *
3. Clothes Closet
(Oven)
1. Pants **
2. Bowtie *
3 . Glove
4. Shoe
5. Hat
4. Construction
(Porch)
1. Drill
2. Hammer **
3 . Saw
4. Saw Horse *
5. Ladder
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5. Desk
(Broom Closet)
1. Briefcase
2 • Lamp
3
. Phone
4. Stapler **
5. Picture *
6. Diner
(Shower)
1. Cup
2
. Fork
3. Salt **
4 . Syrup
5. Ketchup *
7
. Fireplace
(Laundry)
1. Candle
2. Chair **
3. Clock
4 . Logs
5. Bellows *
8
. Refrigerator
(Bedroom)
1 . Butter
2* Cheese
3 . Lettuce *
4. Milk
5. Onion **
9 . Laundry
(Fireplace)
1. Basket
2. Laundry Soap Box *
3 . Hanger
4. Shirt
5. Bleach **
10. Oven
(Clothes Closet)
1. Pot
2. Spoon **
3 . Teapot
4 . Turkey
5. Oven Mit *
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11- Pool
(Street)
1. Flipper
2. Raft
3. Grill
4. Ball **
5. Life Saver *
12
. Porch
(Construction)
1- Birdhouse **
2 . Skate
3
. Pumpkin
4
. Newspaper
5. Watering Can *
13. Kitchen Sink
(Toilet)
1. Coffee Maker
2
. Eggbeater **
3. Toaster
4. Wine Glass
5. Dish Detergent *
14 • Shower
(Diner)
1. Bath Mat **
2. Slippers
3 . Soap *
4 . Towel
5 . Shampoo
15 • Street
(Pool)
1. Bike
2. Fire Hydrant
3. Mailbox
4 . Parking Meter *
5. Wagon **
16. Toilet
(Kitchen Sink)
1. Toilet Brush **
2. Toilet Paper
3. Kleenex
4. Toilet Plunger
5. Baby Powder *
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